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Since I986, scientific concern over inadvertent human modifications of
global climate, and their consequences, has rapidly become public con-
cern. It is now recognized that global mean temperatures have increased
by almost IOC since the middle of last century, though trends in different
regions exhibit great variation, and that the period since I970 has been
marked by an accelerating trend. The I980s contain the warmest years in
the record (Jones, Wigley, and Wright I986).1 Moreover a whole series of
regional temperature extremes over periods such as a year, a season, or a
month has been exceeded during this decade. With atmospheric carbon
dioxide now almost 40 percent above preindustrial levels-a figure likely
to rise to 50 percent by the year 204o-and with the additional recognition
that there has been an almost equal new input of methane, nitrous oxides,
and chlorofluorocarbons, it is generally expected that a significant further
increase in global mean temperature is highly probable. Model computa-
tions suggest that by the time the total "greenhouse gas" content of the
atmosphere has doubled, which could be as soon as between 2030 and
2050, zonal mean annual temperatures may be I °-3 °c warmer in low lati-
tudes, and up to 5°_8 °c warmer in the polar regions. While the lag effects
may delay this result, even for some time, the commitment to such an
increase in atmospheric temperatures will have been created, making such
a rise above "natural" temperatures inevitable. Added to these quite
rational estimates has been the I986 discovery of thinning of stratospheric
ozone. Together, these concerns led in I986 to the formation of an Interna-
tional Geosphere-Biosphere Programme, specifically to study the prob-
lems of global environmental change and their regional impact. This was
followed in I988 by the formation of a parallel international Human Di-
mensions of Global Change Programme, concerned with human causes,
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consequences, and adaptations, and with the problem of achieving "sus-
tainable development" under changing conditions.
A NEW SET OF PROBLEMS
Climatic warming has captured both public and scientific attention, but it
. .-isbyc no-meansthe-only-e1<~ment-in-globaltmvirenm€ntalchange.Wide­
spread degradation of land and ecosystems, deforestation, marine pollu-
tion, and the pollution of poverty are also matters for concern, and, in the
view of some, for primary concern. These matters occupy a strong place
in the Human Dimensions of Global Change Programme. Together, all
are responses to the underlying human forces of population growth, com-
mercialization, and industrialization, and indeed of development. While
the major pollutants are derived from fossil-fuel combustion from indus-
trial processes, and from mining, with sources at present heavily concen-
trated in the populous industrialized countries of the northern hemi-
sphere, significant though lesser pollutants are derived from agricultural
development, from the clearance of tropical forests, and from mining in
the developing world. Growth in the numbers of livestock and the expan-
sion of wet-rice fields are, for example, principal contributors to an
increase in the amount of methane in the atmosphere, which has doubled
in the last fifty years. The environmental consequences of green revolution
technology are substantial. World development has been accompanied by
and in large measure achieved through a massive onslaught on the bio-
sphere, the land, the rivers, the oceans, and the atmosphere.
While some of the causes of global environmental change are respon-
sive to "techno-fix" solutions, given the political will to apply them, others
are far more difficult, and solutions for those that originate in the develop-
ing world are particularly elusive. While energy-related greenhouse-gas
inputs into the atmosphere may become better controlled in the developed
countries and will diminish there, they will probably increase substantially
in the developing world-especially in Asia; moreover, the problems of
resource degradation in the developing world are almost certain to mul-
tiply.
The Impact in the Pacific
The islands of Melanesia, Polynesia, and Micronesia are minute contribu-
tors to pollution at global scale, though land and ecosystem degradation
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are significant problems in many parts of the Pacific, and deforestation is
no new phenomenon in this region. However, the consequences of global
warming in terms of climate, and above all the anticipated rise in the level
of the sea, are problems of a major order in the Pacific region. The impact
of global change on the Pacific, even at the lowest estimates of present pre-
diction, will be as severe as in any other part of the world. For low-lying
-- -islands, and for almostthe.whole_countriesof-Kiribati,Iu.v:a1u,.and_the
Marshall Islands, like the Maldives in the Indian Ocean, even a half-meter
rise in sea level would spell disaster, and the prediction is of a greater rise
than this over the span of the next century. The consequences of climatic
change are potentially much more widespread, but until the possible out-
lines can be modeled in some detail their shape is quite unknown, and so
far there are no forecasts from either modeling or deduction that are wor-
thy of serious attention at regional scale. These statements are expanded
in what follows.
This paper is concerned only with the coming half-century, to about
2040. Most of the "global change" literature looks further forward than
this, to conditions that might eventuate after the greenhouse-gas content
of the atmosphere has doubled. Most predictions therefore relate to the
second half of the twenty-first century, or beyond. However, such condi-
tions would not arise in one jump at that time. It is important to examine
the evidence to see what might happen sooner. During the years when the
Pacific Islands, like other parts of the world, are coming to terms with
these new conditions we might, globally, find means of abating them
before the full consequences develop. However, we cannot prevent what is
already in train. The shape of the coming fifty years is in some measure
already determined by what has been done in the past, is now being done,
and will be done in the next two decades. The causal forces, at least, are
established, with little short-term room for maneuver.
Within the coming half-century it is possible that the sea-level problem
will remain principally a growing threat, though toward the end of this
quite short period it may already be a very serious threat in all low-lying
coastal areas, including islands. Though variability may increase, sus-
tained climatic changes are not likely within this time, except perhaps at
high altitudes in Papua New Guinea and Irian Jaya, since climatic
response to shifts in the forcing conditions of weather tends to occur in
jumps after a period during which the system is able to absorb these new
forces. Much greater variability is, however, quite likely, and effects on
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the incidence and behavior of the £1 Nino-Southern Oscillation (ENSO)
phenomenon-presently entirely beyond the range of acceptable long-
term prediction-may become marked. During this half-century, there-
fore, while the world as a whole is coming to terms with what it has been
doing to its environment, and may begin to change its ways, the Pacific
Island region will have its own opportunity to prepare. In the course of the
.. same.-half~centur-y,-the.transforming- forces-o£development .and change
will have radically modified the nature of the region and its ability to
respond. By the year 2040, when atmospheric carbon dioxide is expected
to reach 150 percent of its levels in the 17°05, the Pacific region will
already be a very different place for reasons quite other than those of
changing environment.
My purpose here is to analyze what can reasonably be predicted, and to
relate anticipated environmental changes to other changes that have an
effect on the ability of the region to manage future environmental crises.
For the latter I rely on presently visible trends. Inevitably this involves
some crystal-ball gazing and exposes me to the certainty of error. It is said
that crystal-ball gazers mostly die of a surfeit of ground glass. At least I
can say with total confidence that I shall not still be around in 2040 to see
how wrong I shall have been proved.
The Threat from the Sea
Contemporary media hype notwithstanding, the major threat of rapid
sea-level rise capable of making low-lying regions wholly uninhabitable
belongs to the longer-term future well into the twenty-first century, rather
than to the immediate future of the coming fifty years. The most imminent
source of rising sea levels is expansion of the upper levels of the oceans,
most rapidly in the top 100-m layer, which adjusts quickly to atmospheric
temperature, then in the waters between this more saline surface layer and
the thermocline, which are the main locus of transfer between high and
low latitudes (Robin 1986). Over a century the rise from expansion might
be at least 30 cm and very possibly much more, but it will certainly be
increasing rapidly by 2040 if global temperatures continue to rise at rates
exhibited since 1970. Whatever this rise, however, it is likely to be offset in
part by abstraction of more water vapor into a warmer atmosphere and by
the temporary storage of frozen moisture in Antarctica because of higher
precipitation. Atmospheric warming will increase ablation around both
the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets and add meltwater to raise the
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ocean level higher; in the long term this is the major threat, exceeding that
from thermal expansion of the oceans. Accumulation of ice at higher alti-
tudes in Antarctica, and to a lesser degree in Greenland, is in the short to
medium term likely to offset this addition of meltwater with a negative
effect of perhaps 10 cm on global sea level (Robin 1986, 343). This in turn
may be partly negated by the meltwater of smaller glaciers in lower lati-
tudes, _huuhe cQllectiv_eme$s.ageis .thatthe. fuJI. effect.oLglohaL warming
on sea level is likely to be delayed. Rightly or wrongly, most of the follow-
ing discussion assumes that such a delay will take place, and that only a
limited rise may be expected within the coming half-century.
The trend is nonetheless upward and likely to remain so. Gornitz,
Lebedeff, and Hansen (1982) obtained a global mean rise of about 12 cm
between 1880 and 1980 that was due to the combined effects of expansion
and melt. The data show considerable regional variation. A net rise of this
order lies well within the normal interannual sea-level variation due to
global circulation changes, particularly during ENSO events. The variation
from mean sea level then attains as much as 30 cm and sometimes more in
the Pacific. Even during a "normal" period in mid-1988 sea level across the
northern tropical Pacific ranged from +16 cm to -19 cm in relation to the
mean (Climate Analysis Center 1988). These variations were persistent
over several months. Present beach systems are adapted to this amount of
variation in sea level. Tsunamis and sea surges under hurricanes exceed
this range, sometimes substantially.
This should not be a reason to relax concern, for these short-term vari-
ations will still occur around a rising mean level of the sea. Because it does
not seem very probable that we shall experience a mean rise of more than
half a meter at most during the coming half-century, the main hazard is
likely to arise from short-term events, especially where these drive higher
seas over shallowing water. Moreover, even a rise of less than half a meter
can lead to saline invasion of fresh-water lenses in coastal areas and can
lift the very shallow fresh-water lenses in atolls. Although it is quite prob-
able that upward growth of coral will widely be able to keep pace with
sea-level rise of this order and rate, increased erosion of unprotected
beaches-already a widespread problem-is very likely. In parts of South-
east Asia where tidal systems of irrigation are practiced, relying on the
incoming tide to pond back fresh rivers and lift water into the fields, an
extension of salt-water invasion is very probable unless rivers are able to
raise their beds in response. While this is not a problem for the Pacific
15"R'3PTi"HPW .....l§'. rlWiiMWIJM!'d"WW ?jIldAlQIk'W 4'* lIit¢ !§l1l!"'C H*'WUIbQQ, ! '1'.
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Islands, it is a reminder that other areas with larger populations are just as
vulnerable as Pacific atolls and cays.
It follows that the more marginal present human occupation is in rela-
tion to the level of the sea, and the more vulnerable this occupation is to
present hazards from tsunami, sea surge, and exceptional sea levels expe-
rienced during global circulation anomalies, the more likely are such areas
to faILe_arty llictims _tQ_,LriS~ iILthe_ S~g_ of n(Lm..QrJ~jha[l~Q_Qr3Q ~m, and
this could happen as soon as the early decades of the coming century.
Some low-lying atolls and cays, especially in dry areas, could lose their
fresh water; the tidal margins of large islands could suffer significant salt-
water invasion; sand cays may be eroded and moved too fast for tall vege-
tation to keep pace; low-lying villages and coastal lands will become much
more vulnerable to surges of the sea. The sea will also build new and
higher beaches, but there is likely to be net loss, not large in total quantity
during this first short period, but serious enough for the people con-
cerned.
The Unknown ofClimatic Change
Much uncertainty still surrounds the threat from the sea, yet this is an area
of clarity and firm prediction by comparison with the effect of global
warming on global climate. About a dozen "general circulation models"
around the world are being used to try to determine the nature of change,
but without adequate incorporation of the effects of global warming on
cloud and the effects of cloud on climate, and without adequate means to
model the variables of ocean-atmosphere coupling, including ocean cur-
rents, the role of ice, and topographic effects, climatologists are still una-
ble to move far toward firm predictions at regional scale. There is still
heavy reliance on historical analogy, including the experience of warm
years and decades in the record, as well as geo-archaeological data on
long-past warm conditions millennia ago.
Even one totally basic element is still shrouded in obscurity. Ostensibly
an increase in temperature should uplift more moisture into the atmo-
sphere by convection and lead to an increase in global rainfall, although
redistributed. As noted, some of this will fall as snow on the ice caps of
Antarctica and Greenland, and it will remain there as ice until a much
greater increase in temperature extends ablation to higher altitudes close
to the poles. It may be significant that the glaciers in Iceland have been
extending in recent years whereas those in the middle latitudes and the
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tropics have been retreating, often quite rapidly. I have noted the possible
slowing of sea-level rise. Despite the increased uptake of moisture into the
atmosphere, it is not beyond likelihood that the net effect for climate of
greater convection on the one hand and locking-up of moisture as ice on
the other, could be a temporary but durable reduction in total atmo-
spheric moisture. This would probably increase the tendency to drought
in_drought-,proneareas, -one-DLwhichjuhe-centraIPacific.-l'henthereis
the largely unknown effect, on total rainfall as distinct from its pattern, of
changes in "albedo"-the reflectiveness of the earth's surface-influenced
by widespread desertification and deforestation. For almost twenty years
there has been a declining trend in the rainfall of some tropical areas,
notably in the African Sahel and extending across the Atlantic into central
America. This could be merely cyclical; there have been prolonged periods
of low rainfall in the Sahel before, even early in this century.
With by far the largest area of uninterrupted ocean-atmosphere interac-
tion, the Pacific Ocean is a key area in the world's weather, and great
efforts have been made to understand its dynamics in the last twenty
years. Since the basic interconnections were first established in the 1950S
and 1960s, and especially since the major ENSO disturbance of 1972 and
the greater one of 1982-1983, an immense amount of research and model-
ing has been undertaken, with a considerable measure of success in
improving understanding. Not only are the tropical interconnections now
better understood, but so increasingly is the interrelation with climate in
middle and even high latitudes. The root causes of much of the variability
in the world's weather as a whole may be found in the Pacific and south-
ern oceans, with the western tropical Pacific a region of particular global
significance.
This latter region, the archipelago extending from Sumatra to New
Guinea, is sometimes described as the "maritime continent" following
Ramage (1968), who established that almost 30 percent of the surface-to-
upper-atmosphere convection in the whole tropical belt around the world
takes place over this archipelago of large tropical islands among warm
seas. This ascending system is linked by high-altitude airflow along the
equator to regions of persistently descending air to east and west, but par-
ticularly in the eastern tropical Pacific. This pattern of equatorial circula-
tion is not stable, but in the Pacific is subject to periodic change during
which convection over the "maritime continent" weakens and moves east,
while descending air in the eastern Pacific is replaced by normal tropical
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convection. These abnormal periods are the ENSO events which some-
times, as in 1972 and in 1982-1983, assume major proportions and have
worldwide ramifications. They are accompanied by heavy rain in the east-
ern Pacific and over the normally dry equatorial islands in the central
Pacific, and by tropical cyclones in the normally cyclone-free central and
eastern Pacific; there is less rain than usual in the western Pacific and over
-the "maritime-continent,"and.sometimes-periods o£quite se¥ere-drought.:t.
These events are not new, but have happened over at least several thou-
sand years. The regularity of the pattern may not have remained constant,
however, and a major question for the Pacific Islands concerns the future
behavior of the system under global warming. We know that ENSO events
have occurred with much the same frequency throughout the last hundred
years and more, and that an ENSO as severe and widespread as that of
1982-1983 took place in 1877-1878 (Kiladis and Diaz 1986), with several
others not much less severe in between. There is at present absolutely no
agreement on the important question whether severe ENSO events will
become more frequent or less frequent with global warming. Moreover,
there is also the question of the opposite phase of the system, in which
exceptionally heavy rains occur in the western Pacific and exceptional
droughts in the equatorial islands of the central Pacific, south of Hawai'i,
and in the eastern Pacific. The future frequency and distribution of tropi-
cal cyclones is notably affected by the future of ENSO phenomena.
The Limits of the Possible
The best outcome that might be expected is that global warming will be
slower than predicted, that sea-level rise will also be slower, and that there
will be no major change in the boundary conditions of Pacific climate well
into the coming century. This is not to say that major disturbances would
become any less frequent. The worst outcome is that the present repre-
sents a sort of "hinge" between slow warming during the past hundred
years and a much more rapid warming in the near future; in this case the
rather steep rise in global mean temperatures that has taken place since
1980 would be continued, rather than being followed by a new period of
leveling off such as that of the 1950S and 1960s. Under a continuation of
rising mean temperatures, the level of the sea could be expected to start
rising more rapidly one or two decades from now, and major changes in
global weather patterns of a nature still unpredicted would begin to
become evident. It could then be that the unusual features of the 1980s,
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with record floods and droughts in several parts of the world, provide an
indicator of what might become normal conditions by early in the twenty-
first century.
Much of the media hype would have us believe the latter scenario, and
this hype serves a useful purpose in sensitizing governments and people
worldwide to the dangers inherent in the present interference with global
.atmosphericchemistr¥.-But-while.the -worst-~case-scenat.:ioispossible-it-is-_.
not established, and we may have more time. Any "remission" in global
warming, such as that which took place before 1970, could lull us all into
believing that nothing serious, after all, is going to happen. And this,
regrettably but unquestionably, would be wrong.
The range of possibilities to be considered for the coming half-century
extends from a small and imperceptibly slow rise in sea level to an acceler-
ating increase in the height of tides and waves, upward displacement of
fresh-water lenses, and saline intrusion. Each or all of these could become
devastating for the habitability of very low islands even within the coming
half-century. In terms of weather, we may experience no strongly felt
changes within this period, or we may experience much more heavy rain
and much more serious droughts, or both, in different parts of the Pacific
region. Cyclones could become less frequent, but alternatively they could
not only become more frequent but extend further into the subtropics and
into regions presently affected only rarely. It would be as well to be pre-
pared for the worst; at best, such preparation would ease the problems
arising from major disasters such as those that have already arisen in mod-
ern times and will continue to occur.
How CAN THE ISLAND COUNTRIES COPE?
For the whole of the independent countries of Kiribati, Tuvalu, and the
Republic of the Marshall Islands, and for all the low islands of Micronesia
and Polynesia, the sea-level problem is dominant, while the future of rain-
fall is also of major concern. For other countries, with large islands and
high land, the sea level presents subregional but not national problems,
though the scale varies according to the proportion of high to low land.
For these countries, the future course of climate is the concern of most
widespread importance. Wherever there is high ground, the coming half-
century presents a need to be prepared to move low-lying coastal settle-
ments inland and to be ready for some losses of agricultural land, while at
*W@N'" Wi'iFmP¥' MMP'@iW'W'HN"h¥9WW»W&IB" ,m'~mMNiii!. i .
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the same time having policies in place to cope with both drought and the
consequences-in terms of road maintenance, increased erosion, and pos-
sible landslides-of heavy and frequent rain. For coastal towns, protec-
tion rather than movement is required, and sewerage and drainage
systems will need to be redesigned to cope with higher outfall levels.
Throughout, agricultural systems must be buffered against the conse-
. - -quences-oLhoth-dwught. and-excess..rain_hy_consenrationmeasU1:eLthar..
can have only beneficial effect in limiting and managing present degrada-
tion.
For the larger Pacific countries these problems are potentially manage-
able within the coming half-century. A prerequisite would seem to be par-
ticipatory democracy in which the cooperation of the people can be
secured, given open provision of information in a manner that will inspire
trust. Coastal settlements have been moved inland in the past after
cyclonic sea surges washed over and destroyed their sites; they can be
moved inland again, progressively over time, if governments and their
people are made aware of the need and cease to erect new buildings very
close to high-tide level. Only under the very worst scenario is it yet neces-
sary to be prepared for replacement of vulnerable capital investments such
as jetties and low-lying airfields. It would otherwise be adequate within
the coming half-century to build no more airfields in threatened locations,
to protect those that exist, and to ensure that jetties can be strengthened
and raised. Unnecessary "disaster" measures and costs can be avoided, or
at least greatly reduced.
This last statement is important because there is no doubt that, when
smitten, many Pacific Island governments will proclaim unforeseen natu-
ral disaster and will seek international aid. Certainly, international assis-
tance will be necessary, but it cannot be unlimited, and should be directed
to those regions in which preventive measures are not feasible, especially
the most vulnerable countries and regions which are discussed later. While
it will be unpopular to say so, there is already more than a tendency in the
Pacific Island countries to seek disaster relief in preference to taking or
encouraging adequate adaptive and preventive measures, and in prefer-
ence to adopting development policies that could embrace such precau-
tions. Indeed, policies continue to be followed that discourage the frag-
mentary remains of self-help and adaptive strategies that existed in the
past. An examination of the record of "disaster relief," following both
severe and mild events in the eastern islands of Fiji since the I970S (Bayliss-
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Smith et al I988), provides one rather clear instance of the manner in
which such relief has become in reality a part of the support system for an
economically declining region, an archipelago whose people were once
able to cope with all but the most extreme events on their own.
The consequences of climatic change for agriculture ought to be a mat-
ter for major concern. In most Pacific Island countries the farming sector
i~iI!al1l!npe~lthy_<.:onditjP11dkpend_ent 01) <.:ash crop_s "ery_yqlner;lbkto _
price fluctuation, with static or near-static production of food crops, and
with growing labor-input problems as the young leave the land and the
farm population ages. Conservation measures, being labor intensive, are
among the first casualties. Moreover, major cash-crop expansions have
been achieved at high cost in land degradation-and with official encour-
agement. There is no doubt that by intensification using conservationist
measures, the productivity of agriculture could be greatly increased, and
increased on less land than is used at present. But there is almost no offi-
cial move in this direction, and private initiatives-which are not uncom-
mon-do not receive much official support. Higher temperatures entailing
greater evaporation, with or without either greater drought or more
intense rainfall, will increase stresses. Even without global change there is
a pressing need for new initiatives in agriculture; the climatic unknown
makes such initiatives imperative. For most Pacific countries the necessary
improvements are entirely feasible, but they require new approaches to
agriculture. An antifarm bias has characterized both macroeconomic pol-
icy and the allocation of resources in the postcolonial Pacific. A future in
which there will be much greater claims on international support than
those of the small countries of the Pacific ought now to be envisaged, and
ought to lead to policies designed to generate greater self-reliance in the
provision of food and other inputs produced on the land.
The Problems of the Most Vulnerable
Some countries, and large regions of other countries, face much more
severe problems even on a modest scenario of global change. I have
already mentioned the effect of rising sea level in atoll and coastal regions.
Even under the worst scenario atolls will probably not become wholly
submerged within the next half-century and perhaps over a much longer
period. Given a probable delay in sea-level rise, it is not likely that many
islands will have been rendered wholly uninhabitable by 2040, and more
likely that only a few will suffer this fate so soon. Even over a longer
b§i4dPliiLWmmWf '''!1M Moil" hi,! !;W
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period the low islands will not necessarily be simply submerged. Coral
growth should be invigorated, and where this happens the seas will throw
up new land-forming material. But storm-driven seas will wash over the
land, and fresh water will become more scarce. If or where greater desic-
cation is added to the threat from the sea, the situation will deteriorate
more rapidly, both from plant stress under drought and from accelerated
..... ...._..._ ..diminutionoLfr.esh..w:ater__CQllY:ersel}':,.iLorwhere_ther.e_is_au_iucI_eas.e_iu
rainfall it will very probably be accompanied by greater storminess,
increasing the rate of physical damage.
Many islands may become unattractive places for human habitation,
even though within the coming half-century they are not likely to vanish
entirely beneath the waves or be destroyed. Both food-crop and cash-crop
production will suffer, and Islanders will have to become much more
dependent on the resources of the reefs and the sea. Within the time frame
of this paper, the probability of economic and nutritional distress, coupled
with a growing shortage of fresh water, is much greater than that of ulti-
mate physical destruction. There is almost no set of coping strategies that
can negate increasing pressures to abandon living on some islands long
before they are eroded into storm-washed piles of reef-rubble, and such
pressures could well be mounting long before the end of the coming half-
century.
For the Islanders themselves as individuals, the problems may ~e less
severe. The people of low-lying regions of larger countries already have
communities of their kin on what will remain dry land, and the people of
some Pacific countries have substantial emigrant communities in the
United States and Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Many among
present and future Islanders will welcome opportunities to join their
migrant kin. For the remainder who lack these opportunities, within the
Pacific principally the populations of Kiribati and Tuvalu, it is reasonable
to expect that "environmental refugee" status will become an option, in
Pacific Rim countries if less readily in other Pacific Island countries. This
would not take place without some opposition from within rim countries,
the nature of which was discussed for Australia in a comprehensive review
of Island-Australia relations carried out in 1986 (M. Brookfield and Ward
1988). Nonetheless, there are solid grounds for hope that rim countries
will be willing to offer new homes to Pacific Islanders displaced by the sea.
Although it is distressing that significant parts of the Pacific Islands may
be facing the prospect of early depopulation by 2040, that prospect may
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be less alarming to those Islanders who are potential migrants. It is not a
prospect that arises only from global change; something of an exodus
from the smaller island countries and regions has already been under way
for some time and has accelerated sharply within the last twenty years.
In a review that looks further forward than this paper does, and reaches
a more devastating prognosis for the low-island Pacific, Ward (n.d.) has
-.raised.an-irnportant-issue.-Many-islands.bare-0f-their-1a-nd-owning-inhab- .
itants will at least for some time remain land, although reduced. As I also
learned at a conference on island development (held in Malta under the
auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in
May 1988), almost every Pacific Island country has received approaches,
such as those lately in the news from Africa, from unscrupulous groups in
developed lands who seek dumping grounds for industrial wastes unac-
ceptable at home-even if always described as "nontoxic." Such would-be
leasers of dumping sites offer what looks like good money, though doubt-
less they expect to make large profits themselves. The owners of islands
deserted because they have become barren, but not destroyed, must
expect to be thought of as very "soft touches" for such tempting offers.
Ward has added the not unlikely prospect of other would-be leasers: peo-
ple who need a remote piece of land, however unattractive for permanent
habitation, as a territorial base for a whole range of less-than-Iegal pur-
suits. Can the governments of island countries and regions facing a real
disaster that will not go away be expected to resist such tempting offers
unaided? And would they in any case be able to resist private deals made
with the absentee owners of land still under their nominal jurisdiction?
Island Governments in an Unkind World
Global change will affect the Pacific Islands in ways other than through
the direct physical effects. In 1988 severe droughts in the continental inte-
riors of North America and the Soviet Union have reduced agricultural
production and diminished global food reserves. By one unproven set of
climatic scenarios this is precisely what is expected from global warming,
though it does not follow that the 1988 events arose from this cause.
Except in low islands and coastal areas the greatest impact of global
change will certainly be on the pattern of world agriculture. Some regions
will benefit, and in others it will be possible to change cropping patterns
and adapt. Yet everywhere there will be large and expensive problems of
adjustment, to which will be added the huge costs of protecting densely
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populated coastal areas or resettling people from these areas. Palliative
measures to reduce the input of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere will
also have costs-not least those of changing systems of energy generation.
The economic costs of global warming, which may include bouts of infla-
tion due to rising food costs, to say nothing of famines in parts of the
developing world, will be severe and will affect great numbers of people.
. . _._._. --.J-Iowwillthis·a£fect-the-w0r-ld~s-wiUingnesstQgi¥e speciaLconsideration-to
the problems of the Pacific Islands? There are particular reasons for con-
cern.
The developed world loves the stable Pacific it has created through its
own mythology, powerfully aided by many Islanders themselves in mod-
ern times. Brilliant blue lagoons, white beaches, palm trees, and smiling,
gaily dressed people twanging sugary music on imported guitars are the
key elements of an image loved from Tromso to Dunedin. When disaster
strikes it is a disaster in Paradise, and the image has been a great asset to
the island countries since it has helped fund a flow of aid that on a per cap-
ita basis tops the world list. Reactions to recent events, especially in Fiji
and Vanuatu-Belau has received less notice-have already shown how
vulnerable the island Pacific is to any dent in this image. Tourist flows,
and investment more generally, reacted very sharply to the military over-
throw of the legal government in Suva, and to unrest in Vila. A world that
has done little more than shrug its shoulders at the steady smashing-up of
Moruroa and thinks of Bikini only as a form of garment minimization is
greatly upset when corrupt or power-hungry politicians and simple-
minded colonels behave in the Pacific Islands much as they do elsewhere
on the globe.
The affluent, developed world is not going to like the idea of its Pacific
Islands dream being invaded by the sea; in the short term it might conceiv-
ably show more concern about this than about greatly increased flooding
in the coastal regions of Asia. However, it is going to be distinctly more
perturbed by the cost of raising Dutch dykes or helping second-home
owners in Florida protect their investments. There will be very much
greater complaint if climatic perturbation raises the cost of food. In a
human-made disaster that creates huge adaptation costs in many parts of
the world, damage done to the Pacific dream will not rank high for long.
Even environmentalists are going to have bigger problems than concern
over islands. The question of deforestation and reforestation will become
a major issue, among many others. Moreover, "green" movements are
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going to have to come to terms with the fact that the risky nuclear power
they presently so strongly oppose adds no greenhouse gases to the atmo-
sphere, whereas "safe" generation by fossil fuels is the major single con-
tributor! With all these wider concerns to engage public attention, there
will not be much patience with island governments that cannot manage
their own problems and cannot help themselves. Worldwide love of the
------Paeific-Islands-is-very-luer-ativeta-the-presentgeneratianof-Paeifie-Island
governments-if often less so to their ordinary people-but it could melt
rather quickly under the universal strains of global warming.
Pacific Island governments and people therefore need soon to contem-
plate a world in which the aid dollar may become a much scarcer com-
modity, though one would hope that it would still flow to those most truly
vulnerable-both those in the Pacific and the many more elsewhere. The
main job of adaptation must be done by the Islanders themselves. Given
the sensitivity to global change of much of Pacific Island settlement and
agriculture, it would be well to undertake the necessary re-orientation of
thinking away from dependence and toward self-sufficiency rather quick-
ly. Factional thinking and action need to give way to a sense of real peril-
not, in the near future, of ultimate physical disaster so much as economic
hardships augmented by cumulative minor disasters and increased stress
on national resources. If the Pacific Island countries are to adapt to global
change they need to develop much greater internal resilience so that real
concern can flow to where it most belongs-those people and places first
in peril. Whether or not this can be done remains to be seen. A very large
and very basic change in thinking about the relationship of the islands and
the Islanders to the world is involved, and recent political events in several
countries do not encourage much belief that the fundamental issues-
social, economic, or environmental-are rising to the top in national or
regional consciousness.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that interference with global atmospheric chemistry,
and the widespread degradation of resources that also reflects human atti-
tudes to the physical base of life, will cause problems for the coming gen-
erations, beginning with the next. We are alerted to some, but not all, of
the changes that can be expected to take place. We do not know how fast
they will happen. For the Pacific Islands some of these untoward events,
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above all the likelihood of rising sea levels, are of very serious import.
This region needs to be as aware as any of the possible eventualities. Even
though within the Pacific the physical impact will vary from mere trouble-
someness to ultimate destruction of habitability, there will be more perva-
sive consequences as the global economic system is disturbed by the need
for adaptation in all regions. The degree of dependency of small-country
.. e€anamies- in-fhe-Pacifi€- make-s--this--Fl.?gi0n-veFy-vuln~abl~-tQ-the-wider
consequences of global change.
The best hope must lie in the still-open possibility that the major secular
changes will take place more slowly than either the media hype or the
more alarmist scientific predictions suggest. Well before the year 2040 we
shall know; at present we do not. But it is better to prepare for the worst,
and this means both major intraregional and intracountry adaptations of
human settlement and resource use, as well as preparation for the possibil-
ity that some whole regions, and three whole countries, may be approach-
ing unhabitability within half a century. Although external aid and succor
may still be available, and very necessary if large-scale migrations come to
be needed, the region is going to need all the self-reliance it can regenerate
after a century and a half of growing dependency. Self-reliance needs to be
local, national, and international-all three at once. There is a long way
to go in this respect if the Pacific Islands are going to cope with this new
set of problems thrust on them by the larger world.
, ,
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Notes
I This paper is deliberately referenced very lightly. The huge literature in this
area is mostly of a technical nature. Reasonably up-to-date and reliable state-
ments are provided by Bolin et al 1986 and Pearman 1988. I am grateful to Profes-
sor R. G. Ward for helpful comments on a draft; however, I take full responsibil-
ity for all statements and opinions expressed.
----2Among m-a-ny-sources,a-useIiirrecent summarytS proviaeobyAIEin 1988.- -
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